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Abstract In the aspiration to upscale their activities in the global South, development aid agencies
have a tendency to design and implement generic models. These are often associated with desired char-
acteristics and principles, such as participation or inclusion of the poorest. However, in the dynamic
environment in which models are implemented, the design characteristics and principles are mitigated,
adapted or reinforced by context-speciﬁc socially embedded institutions through a process of bricolage.
This process is driven and shaped by power relations and, as a consequence, development interventions
tend to reproduce local power structures, and beneﬁts derived from the projects are likely to be captured by
elites to the detriment of others. Models thus carry the danger of reproducing and even increasing existing
inequalities. Similarly, initial claims of participation or inclusion of the poorest often fail to materialize.
We develop these arguments by focusing on the Water Users Association model in Lilongwe, Malawi.
Dans le but d’améliorer leurs activités dans le Sud global, les agences de développement ont manifesté une
tendance à concevoir et implémenter des modelés génériques. Souvent ces modèles sont associes a des
principes et caractéristiques « souhaités », tels que la participation ou l’inclusion des plus pauvres.
Cependant, l’environnement dynamique au sein duquel ces modèles sont implémentés mitige, adapte, ou
renforce les principes et caractéristiques de leur design, à travers d’un procès de bricolage par des institutions
speciﬁques au contexte, et ancrées socialement. Ce processus est dicté et formé par les relations de pouvoir
et, par consequence, les interventions de développement tendent à renforcer les structures de pouvoir locales;
les beneﬁces derivées des projets sont souvent captées par les elites au détriment des autres. Donc, les
modeles intrinsequement peuvent reproduire et meme accroitre les inégalités existantes. Les revendications
initiales de participation ou inclusion des plus pauvres souvent ne se matérialisent pas. Nous développons
ces arguments en nous focalisant sur le modelé de l’Association des Utilisateurs d’Eau à Lilongwe, Malawi.
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Introduction
In the aspiration to upscale their activities, development agencies have a tendency to develop
generic models for interventions in the global South. We deﬁne models as a prescribed set of
structures and principles, which together form a blueprint to intervene in a given situation.
Underlying these models is a particular, stabilized interpretation of what is identiﬁed as the
problematic situation that the model is to address (Rap, 2006). The stabilized interpretation of the
problematic situation allows the model to be broadly applicable, independently from the different
socioeconomic realities in which it is implemented.
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Generally development models share two features. First, they embody an ideological
dimension both in the deﬁnition of the problematic situation and in the design structures and
principles that constitute the model itself. Thus, these are often ‘enriched’ by ‘desired characteristics’
such as participation and empowerment that have become ‘seemingly universal values’ in the
development discourse (Cornwall, 2007, p. 472). Second, models tend to be presented as embodying
a dimension of success and qualify as ‘success stories’ (Molle, 2008, p. 138). Often anecdotes and
‘best-practices’ are utilized to highlight this ‘success’. Apart from producing ‘success’ of models
through the selection of favorable pilot sites and through sympathetic evaluations by promoters,
‘cultural, esthetic and ideological understandings and practices’ are employed to conﬁrm and bolster
the ‘success’ of the model (Rap, 2006, p. 1313).
In the process of bolstering success, some actors from the national and international
development establishment ‘work hardest of all to maintain coherent representations of their
actions as instances of authorized policy, because it is always in their interest to do so’
(Mosse, 2004, p. 639). Successful models constitute a means for national elites, NGOs and
other agencies from the development establishment to ensure funding from bilateral and
international donors, and to legitimate their policies and development strategies (Mosse,
2004; Molle, 2008; Osserwaarde et al, 2008; Rusca and Schwartz, 2012). Similarly, through
embracing and disseminating a particular model, consultants and ‘experts’ may develop
lucrative careers and gain support from multilateral and bilateral donors, who see models as
a way of efﬁciently upscaling their development activities and the associated transfer of funds
(Rap, 2006).
The politics of developing and promoting such models have been subject to con-
siderable research in past years (Roe, 1991; Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006; Molle, 2008). In
this article we focus on the relationship between the generic model and the everyday prac-
tices of contestation and consolidation of its implementation.1 We explore what happens to
these blueprint models and their associated design characteristics when they are applied in an
everyday life context, with speciﬁc social conﬁgurations, spatial characteristics and eco-
logical constitution. We argue that through everyday practices, design principles associated
with a generic model are mitigated and adapted. By incorporating socially embedded
institutions that reﬂect local power structures, models carry the danger of reproducing
and even increasing existing inequalities. As a result, initial claims, such as participation or
inclusion of the poorest, often fail to materialize (Fritzen, 2007; De Wit and Berner, 2009;
Rusca and Schwartz, 2014). We develop these arguments by ﬁrst presenting a literature-based
discussion on the relation between generic development models and context-speciﬁc
legal, administrative or social-cultural orders. We then discuss the case of the Water Users
Association (WUA) model, established in the context of a water supply project imple-
mented by the international NGO WaterAid in peri-urban Lilongwe, Malawi. The project,
which is presented by WaterAid as a successful model to be replicated within and outside
Malawi, was initiated in 2007 and is currently being upscaled to other low-income areas
in Lilongwe.
Fieldwork for developing the case study was undertaken from November 2008 to February
2009 and from November 2013 to January 2014. Forty-eight semi-structured interviews were
held with representatives of WaterAid (both at the headquarters in London and at the ofﬁce of
the Country Programme in Malawi), as well as WUAs representatives and key informants
involved in or knowledgeable about the WUAs. Focus group discussions were held with
WUAs, Community-based Organizations and the local NGO partners. Opinions of local
consumers were gathered through semi-structured questionnaires with 30 households in the
area beneﬁting from the project.
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Generic Models and the Everyday Practices
The Context Speciﬁcity and Generic Models
In contrast with the idea of the broad applicability of models, various authors have highlighted
how the complexities and uniqueness of context inﬂuence the outcome of the implementation of
development models (Riggs, 1962; Cleaver, 2002, 2012). The inﬂuence of context on generic
models has been explored from different disciplinary perspectives and draws from diverse
empirical evidence. As far back as 1962, Riggs argued that bureaucracies in developing countries
incorporate elements of both the Western bureaucratic model and the traditional societies, leading
to ‘a set of new administrative structures, different from both the traditional and the modern, and a
product of the mixture’ (Riggs, 1962, p. 22). At the core of this argument is the idea that groups in
society are simultaneously exposed to and draw from different legal, administrative or social-
cultural orders, developing new sets of mixed arrangements and rules. On a similar note, legal
pluralism refers to the ‘coexistence and potential interdependence of local laws and disputing
processes with the law and the administrative apparatus’ (von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-
Beckmann, 2006, p. 2).
Critical institutionalism draws similar conclusions on the relation between and interdepen-
dence of different institutional arrangements, by rejecting the dichotomy between ‘traditional’
and ‘modern’ institutions (Cleaver, 2002). Prevailing institutions are a mix of traditional and
modern arrangements, resulting from a process of bricolage, through which norms, values and
arrangements are consciously or unconsciously molded to serve a given purpose. In the process,
the boundaries of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ become indistinct ‘and tradition becomes reinvented’
(Cleaver, 2002, p. 24). In a paper signiﬁcantly entitled ‘How institutions elude design’, Cleaver
and Franks (2005) argue that simple evolutionism, the idea of replacing traditional with modern
institutions, does not reﬂect the dynamism and complexities of institutional formation and
development. The process of bricolage is authoritative and, as ‘some bricoleurs are likely to
posses more authoritative resources than others’ (Cleaver, 2002, p. 19), social inequalities may be
preserved and reproduced. Cleaver (2002, p. 28) concludes that ‘the introduction of new
bureaucratic institutions or organizational arrangements are not necessarily robust and enduring,
nor do they automatically ensure beneﬁcial collective action and optimum resource use’.
Consequently, institutions that are not developed through an internal process of bricolage, but
imposed externally, may be perceived as illegitimate.
Generic Models in the Water Services Sector
Generic models have played a fundamental role in shaping urban water supply strategies and
development projects in the global South. The ‘modern infrastructural ideal’, promoting delivery
of standardized water services by a single monopolistic provider to the entire urban population
(Graham and Marvin, 2001), has guided development initiatives in the urban water sector over
the past 50 years. With the onset of neoliberalism in the 1980s, the nature of the organization
providing services and the institutions under which such an organization operates have been
subject to considerable debate (Brown et al, 2000; Bakker, 2003; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005)
and preference shifted towards private organizations or public-private partnerships. The ideal of
standardized services provided through a single network, spatially bounded and uniformly
managed, remained, however, predominant.
In recent years international donors and lending agencies appear to be questioning the ‘modern
infrastructural ideal’ (McGranahan et al, 2006). ‘New’ service delivery models, including
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co-production (Harvey, 2007; Ahlers et al, 2014; Marston, 2014) and formalization of small-
scale independent providers (Njiru, 2004; Samson, 2006; ADB, 2008; Schaub-Jones, 2008;
World Bank, 2009; Ahlers et al, 2013; Cheng, 2014), are increasingly being propagated by
donors and lending agencies as acceptable service modalities that may co-exist or operate in
partnership with the formal utility (Batley, 2006; Ahlers et al, 2014). The shift to acknowledging
multiple service modalities has not undermined the faith in ‘blueprint models’, which interna-
tional donors and development agencies remain devoted to for their interventions (WSP, 2009,
2010; WaterAid, not dated).
The WUA Model
The WUA model emerged in the 1970s, as an alternative to state-run irrigation systems,
increasingly perceived as underperforming (Rap, 2006; Meinzen-Dick, 2007). Decentralization of
operation and maintenance tasks to WUAs has been promoted as a way to reduce overhead costs
and increase efﬁciency (Smet, 2003; Suhardiman and Giordano, 2014). A similar assumption is
made on revenue collection: not only are local farmers better placed to collect revenue, but this
organizational form is also likely to increase willingness to pay within the association (Smet,
2003; Manor, 2004).
Promoted by development and lending agencies as an ‘institutional panacea’ (Meinzen-Dick,
2007, p. 15203) to optimize performance of irrigation systems, the WUA model is designed
around desired characteristics of collective management, empowerment and participation, and
goals of efﬁciency and full cost recovery (Watson et al, 1997; Smet, 2003; Rap and Wester,
2013; Suhardiman and Giordano, 2014). A study by the World Bank’s researchers Watson et al
(1997, pp. 19–20) calls for the ‘need’ to establish WUAs to achieve ‘more efﬁcient water delivery
services’ while at the same time ensuring that projects are ‘better adapted to local needs and
constraints’. According to the same study, members of the association jointly ‘develop common
experiences and social norms over time’ (Watson et al, 1997, p. 107) that form the basis for
decision making within the association. In this respect, WUAs are seen as a
demand-oriented approach because their organizational structure can be so designed so that they enable
users to express their preferences, negotiate pricing and other contributions, and provide a platform for
users to exercise their ‘voice’ with outside organizations. (Watson et al, 1997, p. 101)
The model is therefore based on the assumption that user participation will not only lead to
more democratic and equitable water allocation, but also empower farmers, allowing for
increased autonomy and direct control over the resource. WUAs are seen as a way to give
‘people at the grass roots greater inﬂuence over decisions that affect them’ (Manor, 2004, p. 194;
see also Uphoff, 1992). Development and lending agencies promoting this model assume that
users have shared interests, and their ability to inﬂuence decisions makes farmers more willing to
contribute to the ﬁnancial sustainability of this service provision modality. Last, members of
WUAs are believed to have local knowledge that will improve sustainability of service provision.
More recently, possibly because of the ‘optimisms’ with which WUAs have been presented in
the irrigation sector (Meinzen-Dick et al, 2002; Rap, 2006), this model has become more popular
in urban water supply projects in low-income areas or informal settlements. In this context,
WUAs have been strongly linked to point source technologies such as water kiosks (GTZ, 2009;
WaterAid, not dated). Water kiosks are communal facilities situated in ﬁxed locations where
consumers can purchase water. The water supplied at the kiosk may originate from an
independent water source or be supplied by the formal water utility (Kariuki and Schwartz,
2005). In the latter case water kiosks represent a low-cost technological alternative to extend
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services, where the water utility is unwilling or unable to provide services through in-house
connections. The formal water utility supplies bulk water to the kiosk, from where it is sold to
individual consumers. The WUA is one of the possible organizational modalities to operate
these kiosks. WaterAid deﬁnes the WUA model as a management system constituted by a
‘cooperative water society where the communities establish a legal business entity and register
it with the Government to operate all water facilities in a designated area’ (WaterAid, not dated,
p. 6). In these areas WUAs sell water at the kiosks, collect revenue and pay the water utility for
the bulk water.
While much research has been undertaken on irrigation WUAs (Rap, 2006; Meinzen-Dick,
2007; Rap and Wester, 2013; Suhardiman and Giordano, 2014), very little is known about the
equivalent organizational structure in the urban water supply context. Water Users Association in
irrigation and water supply services therefore share the same guiding principles of participation,
equity, autonomy, and goals of efﬁciency and full cost recovery, attributable to the neoliberal
‘development orthodoxy’ (Suhardiman and Giordano, 2014, p. 91). Furthermore, both types of
association are structured around users committees that are to streamline decision making and are
usually established as formal organizations such as trusts, companies or some form of voluntary
society (Smet, 2003; WaterAid, not dated).
WUA for Urban Water Supply in Lilongwe, Malawi
Water Supply Services in Lilongwe
Lilongwe, the capital of Malawi since 1975, has the highest population in the country, with
estimates ranging between 972 000 (Urban Structure Plan of Lilongwe, LCC, 2013) and 800
907 (Lilongwe Water Board, 2013). Of the total population, approximately 70–75 per cent lives
in 26 low-income areas (LIAs), in poor housing conditions and with little access to urban
services (NSO, 2008; UN-HABITAT, 2011). The government has, since colonial times, relied
on local chiefs for community development, and cultural, religious and administrative matters
(Cammack et al, 2009). After independence and the onset of one-party rule in 1964, the newly
established central government enacted the Chiefs Act, which conferred the President with
the authority to appoint Chiefs and to decide upon their salaries (Eggen, 2011). Traditional
systems and authorities therefore continue to play a major role and Malawians are nowadays at
the same time ‘citizens of the state and subjects under a state-enforced chieftaincy system’
(Eggen, 2011, p. 313).
Until the beginning of the 1970s, water service provision was limited to the oldest parts of the
city, which in Figure 1 are identiﬁed as Areas 1, 2 and 3. In 1972, shortly before the relocation of
the capital in Lilongwe, services were extended to Area 20 (Capital Hill and Parliament
Building), Area 12 (residential area for senior government ofﬁcials), Area 15 (residential area
for middle-level government ofﬁcials), Area 27 (industrial area) and Area 35 (Army ofﬁces and
residential area). Between 1975 and 1978, the network also reached Area 13 (hotels and ofﬁce
buildings), and Area 16 (banks), Area 19 (part of the City Center) and the residential Area 25.2
According to the latest census (NSO, 2008), the Lilongwe Water Board, the sole authority with
the mandate of providing services within the city limits (Waterworks Act, 1995), serves 31 per
cent of the total urban population through in-house connections and yard taps and 41 per cent
through the kiosks (NSO, 2008).3 The kiosks are run by different management systems. Some of
the kiosks are operated directly by utility employees who are responsible for selling water at the
kiosk and collecting revenue. While this service modality ensures high revenue collection, it has
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high operation costs, as the salary of the kiosk attendant is borne by the water utility: the service
delivery to low-income areas is already subsidised […] and you are having a lot of people
employed, with very high staff costs. At the same time we were given the task to minimize
Figure 1: Map of Lilongwe.
Source: Based on National Statistics Ofﬁce of Malawi (2008), population and housing census 2008.
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numbers.4 Other kiosks are run by private entrepreneurs, CBOs or faith-based organizations. The
Lilongwe Water Board subsidizes the bulk water supplied to the kiosk, and the costs of the
private operator or CBO operating the kiosk are added to the end fee charged to the consumer.
Numerous cases are known where local elites, composed of both traditional leaders and
politicians, embezzled the revenue collected at the kiosks, with the result that many communities
ended up being in debt with the water utility. According to the Water Board, there was a lot of
political interference, politicians used to go there, play their games (ibid.). WaterAid’s analysis
suggests that abuses by politicians and traditional leaders have led to communities’ disillusion-
ment, lack of a sense of ownership and in some cases acts of vandalism against the water
facilities.5 Furthermore, private operators charged elevated water fees to residents, who paid at
least twice the price charged for water supplied through in-house connections in higher-income
neighborhoods. The Lilongwe Water Board summarizes the situation as critical: despite the
subsidy on bulk water, there were issues of ownership, issues of vandalism, issues of proﬁteering,
with privates trying to maximise the proﬁt.6 Service provision to low-income areas is described
by the General Director of the Lilongwe Water Board as a very big challenge. First in the sense
that you don’t have access through which you can pass pipes. When it comes to the construction
of the facility [i.e. kiosks] you don’t have room. […] Revenue collection has been a challenge
because there has been a culture of non-payment.7 Because of this ‘culture of non-payment’,
the General Director Lilongwe Water Board was considering rationing or even cutting services at
the kiosks: we reached a point in which we had accumulated over 31 million Malawi Kwacha
[i.e. approximately 218 000 USD] in arrears and in our terms, it’s quite a bit of money. We
reached the point to say enough is enough (ibid.). In areas where consumption rates were below
200 m3/month and, as such, were considered ﬁnancially unviable, the Water Board planned to
disconnect the kiosks. Implementing this measure would have meant closing 40 per cent of the
operational kiosks. WaterAid Malawi’s intervention was targeted at reversing the rationing and
kiosk disconnection policy.
Designing the Model: Goals, Principles and Institutions
In 2009, WaterAid’s mission was to ‘overcome poverty by enabling the world’s poorest
people to gain access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene education’.8 The INGO’s main
interest in the project was the provision of affordable and safe water to the poor, while
ensuring empowerment and participation of local communities in decision making on
water service provision to their areas.9 Given Lilongwe Water Board’s monopoly on service
provision within city boundaries and the dependency of low-income areas on the bulk water
supplied by the latter, WaterAid aimed to achieve this goal by ensuring continuity of service
provision by the water utility. The Lilongwe Water Board, on the other hand, aimed to comply
with its obligation to provide potable water to low-income areas within city boundaries, while
operating as a full commercial entity and thus achieving full cost recovery (Waterworks Act,
1995). For the utility, key priorities were recovering outstanding debts, ensuring high revenue
collection, and minimizing its presence and role in the provision of services to low-income
areas, while at the same time fulﬁlling its statutory obligation of supplying water to all
residents. For the Lilongwe Water Board the only way out was to source out.10 To achieve
these goals, the INGO and the water utility designed and established a management system
capable of ensuring ‘mutual satisfaction by the communities and water service providers’
(WA-LWB MoU, November 2004). This translated into the overarching objective of
‘providing sustainable, affordable and safe water to the poor while embracing full cost
recovery’ (WaterAid, not dated, p. 8).
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In practice, two entities were established for this purpose: a service provider, the WUA,
responsible for operating the kiosks, and a Kiosk Management Unit (KMU), under the Finance
Department of the Lilongwe Water Board. The KMU is entirely dedicated to supporting
management of kiosks and acting as a regulator and mediator on the basis of consumer
complaints. According to WaterAid, this management system was selected and approved by the
local communities. Despite the fact that previously implemented management options of direct
management by the LWB, management by private operators and management by point water
committees were considered non-viable by the formal service provider or ‘had previously failed
miserably’11, communities were given the opportunity to choose between these options and that
of management by WUAs. All six targeted communities opted for the establishment of WUAs.
Interviews with consumers, however, raise questions on the inclusiveness and effectiveness of
this participatory process. Consumers interviewed appeared to be unaware of the existence of the
WUAs, let alone the selection of the management system and the election of WUA members.
The resulting model is strongly based on ‘modern’ bureaucratic institutions, which are to
guide the functioning of the WUAs. First, emphasis is placed on the concept of autonomous
service providers operating under private sector institutions and neoliberal principles (Baetti
et al, 2006; Suhardiman and Giordano, 2014): not only are the WUAs to operate under
principles of full cost recovery, they are also entitled to make proﬁt, which is to be reinvested
within the community. Second, WUAs are formalized through the registration as cooperative
water societies, thus enhancing the capacity of the LWB to exert its authority over these
service providers: dealing with a legal entity makes it much easier when it comes to
enforcement.12 Furthermore, the structure and functioning of the WUA mimics that of a
formal water utility, with a hierarchic structure, a written constitution, and various policies and
procedures to guide employees. All WUAs are composed of a Board of Trustees, an Executive
Committee and a Secretariat. The role of the Board of Trustees is to give the strategic direction
to the Executive Committee and monitor and approve its decisions (Constitution, Article 4.7).
The Executive Committee supervises the activities of the Secretariat and facilitates the
relationship between the Board and the Secretariat (Article 5.7). The Committee members
meet once every month (see Table 1: Structure and responsibilities within the WUA). WUAs
operate according to the same constitution and policies, some of which deal with the daily
functioning of the WUAs, others with additional and extraordinary activities. For policies
regarding procurement of goods and services, cash management, and auditing, the WUAs
have aligned themselves to the procedures adhered to by the formal Water Board. In addition,
the Associations have also developed detailed policies for employees, board members and
executive committee members regarding annual leave, maternal and paternal leave, access to
loans, and funeral allowances.
Table 1: Structure and Responsibilities within the WUA
WUA organizations Responsibilities Membership
Board of Trustees Set strategic direction for the WUA; design policies and
regulations
3–7 persons
Executive Committee Supervise the Secretariat; Facilitate the relationship between the
Board and the Secretariat
10–15 persons
Secretariat Day-to-day functioning of the WUA; management of kiosk
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Although the Secretariat is the organ that operates the WUA on a daily basis, its role and
responsibilities are not mentioned in the constitution. The Administrator heads this ofﬁce and is
responsible for managing the kiosks, ensuring that people are supplied with save [sic] and clean
water all time, and making sure that kiosks are not braking down. In practice, the tasks of the
Administrator are to monitor fellow employees who are under [his/her] position. We have kiosk
attendants, kiosk inspectors, plumbers and a guard. […] I collect the sales made by the kiosk
attendants in 44 kiosks and put it in the bank account weekly. […] I do the payments for the
employees, to the Lilongwe Water Board, calculating the price we are buying from them, and pay
for the purchase of goods.13 Last, the relationship between the KMU and the WUAs is regulated
by a service contract: the Lilongwe Water Board is responsible for providing water and for
responding to any calls of the WUA in a timely manner (Area 50 Service contract, Article 7.2).
The WUAs are responsible for providing services at the kiosk, collecting revenues from the
consumers and paying the bill, including actual consumption and a portion of the arrears, to the
Water Board (Area 50 Service contract, Article 7.3; see Figure 2: The WUA Model).
Implementing the Model: Context Speciﬁcity and Everyday Practices of Service Provision
While the design principles and structure of the WUA reﬂect ‘modern’ institutions, the outcome
of the everyday implementation includes socially embedded institutions, which adapt the model
to the local context. For the management system to be implemented and effectively work, the
system was to gain support of local chiefs. First, ensuring locations for the kiosks required
consensus from landowners, the chiefs. Similarly, because of their mandate to keep ﬁnancial and
statistical records of the local population (Cammack et al, 2009; NSO, 2008), Traditional
Authorities (TAs) were best placed to report on vandalism. Incorporating elites, and in particular
the chiefs meant a smooth and more effective implementation of the new management system for
project partners. Last, regardless (or because) of their authority in the community, chiefs are
nominated by the President of Malawi and mandated to participate in any developmental activity
within these communities. Their involvement is obligatory.
Rather than aiming at a broader and more ‘democratic’ approval of the water supply system,






































Figure 2: The WUA model.
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approval of local elites, by granting them a number of privileges ranging from key positions
within the Associations, to authority in decision making, to ﬁnancial beneﬁts and increased
status within the community. In particular, rather than addressing the challenge of misappro-
priation of funds by local elites, the practice of embezzlement was institutionalized by
incorporating the perpetuators in the WUAs: now they are no longer playing their games
in the low-income areas. We have them in the Board, we have them in the Executive
Committees.14 While the Board is per policy composed of the most prominent members of the
community (traditional chiefs, religious leaders and local members of parliament), ofﬁcially it
is the community members who elect the Executive Committee representatives. Community
members aspiring to this position are to apply before elections and, if shortlisted, can run for
ofﬁce. In practice, however, it is chief's discretion to choose out of his constituency someone
who will be able to speak on their behalf.15 Furthermore, responses from the household survey
suggest that the majority of the people living in the project area were unaware of both the
elections of and application procedures for the Executive Committee. As a result, both the
‘strategic’ and the ‘supervisory’ organ of the WUAs were co-opted by local elites.
Second, the authority of elites is ensured through a strategic distribution of responsibilities
and beneﬁts within the Association’s layers. WUAs are designed in such a way that key
responsibilities for service provision, such as operational tasks and ﬁnancial management, are
with the Secretariat, while decision-making power is with the Board and the Executive
Committees. The members of the Board have self-regulating powers, are responsible for
designing policies and regulations, establish their own honorarium (Constitution, Articles 4
and 8), and decide upon the employment of kiosk attendants. On the other hand, the
Secretariat, responsible for all activities of the WUAs, has no decision-making power and is
composed of only one member and the ﬁeld staff (that is, kiosk attendants and a plumber).
Although the structure of the WUAs appears rather top-heavy, members of the WUA
themselves do not seem to question or challenge this structure. On the contrary, both
Administrators and Committee Members agree that it is necessary to have elites guiding the
organization: we need them, they know better16.
Third, the decision-making power ensures entitlement to other beneﬁts, such as ﬁnancial
incentives, which are directly decided upon by Board members. Formally, members of the
Executive Committee and the Board of Trustees are not employed by the WUA but act as
advisors. As such, they receive a monthly honorarium rather than a salary. Members of the
Secretariat, however, are employees fully dedicated to service provision and thus entitled to a
salary. Although an ofﬁcial distinction is made between salaries and honoraria, when
comparing the ﬁnancial beneﬁts of employees and advisors it appears that Board and
Executive Committees gain the most from this distribution (see Table 2: Honoraria and
salaries). The Board meets every 3 months, but members receive a monthly honorarium. This
honorarium is approximately equivalent to between one-third and one-fourth of the monthly
salary of the Administrator, who works full time and is ultimately responsible for the kiosk
attendants and their performance, as well as for all ﬁnancial aspects, including the payment of
bulk water to the Lilongwe Water Board.
In addition, WUAs’ policies and regulations may potentially increase the status of local elites
and, thereby reinforce inequalities. Policies explicitly reafﬁrm the distinction between elites and
‘ordinary’ community members (Policies and procedure, Mgona, October 2008, p. 29). This
distinction is then used to deﬁne the amounts that the WUA allocates to funerals, where ‘ordinary
community members’ receive 10 times less than leaders such as village heads, politicians and
church leaders (see Table 3: Amounts donated for different community events). The same
distinctions are made within the Water Users Associations: Board and Executive Committee are
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entitled to privileges that are equal to and exceed those granted to the employees. When it comes
to funeral allowances, kiosk attendants are denied any ﬁnancial support, while Board members
and Executive Committee members are entitled to allowances equal to two to 6 months salaries of
Table 2: Honoraria and Salaries (Malawi Kwatcha - MKW)














Chinsapo 5000 4300 3800 3500 3500 3000 17 000
Mtandire/
Mtsiliza
2250 2250 1500 1500 1500 1500 15 750
Kauma NA 2000 1700 1700 1700 1700 12 000
Area 50 2500 2500 2250 NA 2200 2250 13 000
Mgona 2200 2200 2000 2000 2000 2000 6 500
Chimutu III NA 3500 3000 3000 3000 3000 13 500
Source: KMU (2009).
Table 3: Amounts donated for different community events
Community event Amount donated
(Malawi Kwatcha - MKW)
Funerals of ordinary community members 200
Funerals of leaders such as village heads, politicians, church leaders 2000
Installation of traditional authorities 5000
Installation of group village heads 3000
Installation of village heads 1000
Other equally important functions 1000
Source: Policies and procedure, Mgona, October 2008.












Loans — — Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Annual
leave
— — 24 days 21 days 21 days 18 days 18 days
Maternal
leave
— — 3 months 3 months 3 months 3 months 3 months
Paternal
leave
— — 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month
Sick leave — — Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leave
grant
— — 20% 30% 30% 50% 50%
Funeral
Allowance
5000MKW 3500MKW 4000MKW — — — —
Coffﬁn 15000MKW 10000MKW 10000MKW — — — —
Source: KMU (2009).
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the kiosk attendants (see Table 4 WUAs Policies and procedures for employees and other active
members). Such beneﬁts, we argue, lead to an additional indirect beneﬁt: the power to distribute
proﬁts within the community by selecting events and projects to be developed increases the status
of local elites within the community. The proﬁt-making mechanism becomes another way of
ensuring privileges to the ‘important’ community members and further increases the tension
between the design principles embedded in the model and the practices that undermine them. As a
member of a local NGO implementing the project highlighted, you are getting money from poor
people, but you are conducting meetings at hotels, lake shore areas […] all while the access to
water is less than 100 per cent.17
Mechanisms to re-balance these asymmetries are included in the policies, but rarely
implemented. It is established, for instance, that each WUA is to organize an annual general
meeting to present and discuss ﬁnancial reports and to decide on WUAs’ surplus spending. In
practice, however, annual general meetings do not take place regularly18 and, in some cases, the
selection of attendees only includes inﬂuential community members (clergy, public companies
employees, chiefs). ‘Ordinary’ community members seem to be displaying surprisingly little
contestation: some seem to be unaware of the system, while others consider WUA bodies to be
reserved for inﬂuential community members and employees.19
The Impact of Institutional Bricolage on Service Provision
The elaboration regarding the composition, enumeration and secondary beneﬁts of the
different organs of the WUA becomes relevant when it comes to assessing the service
provided by the WUAs. First, WUAs are an expensive service provider. At the beginning
of this research (2008–2009), the Water Board was selling water to the WUAs at MK2
58 per m3. The WUAs, in turn, were reselling this water at more than double this price at the
kiosk (MK 125/m3). In 2014, the ratio of the price of the bulk water (MK 91/m3) and the ﬁnal
price to consumers (MK 300/m3) had grown from 1:2.15 to 1:3.29. The high price charged at
the kiosks to consumers is the result of a number of factors. As the WUA has to follow the
principles of cost-recovery and proﬁt-making, all costs associated with the incorporation of
the local elite in the WUA and the repayment of arrears automatically translate into higher
prices at the kiosks. The top-heavy design of the WUA means high personnel costs. Although
the WUA is only responsible for a small component of service delivery (revenue collection),
the overhead resulting from the many Board members and Executive Committee members is
considerable.
Second, the WUA not only has to cover its service costs, but also has to pay the arrears that
have resulted from the embezzlement of kiosk funds prior to the establishment of the WUAs. As
such, the payments of the previous debt are included in the price charged to consumers at the
kiosk. According to WaterAid, there is ‘commendable improvement in billing and repayment of
arrears’. From the peak value of MKW 30.5 million in January 2006, arrears dropped to MKW
14.5 million by January 2007 (WaterAid, not dated, p. 7).
Last, despite the increase in price, the WUAs were hardly able to ensure improved service
provision to their consumers: asset maintenance and continuity of the service remain of poor
quality. In case of breakage, a response from the Lilongwe Water Board may take up to 3 months.
The complex bureaucratic procedures adopted by the utility for the procurement of goods further
slow down the simplest repair. Some kiosks have been abandoned because LBW considered the
costs of repairing them too high and therefore not viable. In some areas shortages last –2–3 days20
while other areas are only supplied 2 days per week.21
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Conclusions
Development projects are not implemented in a vacuum. Models are designed as generic
constructions, but have to deal with the complexities and diversity of the local social and political
context. To be ‘understood’ and accepted locally, generic models are transformed to reﬂect socio-
political realities and, as such, carry the danger of reproducing existing disparities and local power
asymmetries. The implementation of the WUA model is the result of a negotiation, an authoritative
process (Cleaver, 2002) in which some groups and interests prevail to the detriment of others. In the
everyday implementation of the model goals, guiding principles and institutions that prevail and
guide service delivery are the ones that align with the interests of the most powerful players, the
Lilongwe Water Board and the elites within the targeted community. For the utility, the priorities
were recovering outstanding debts, ensuring high revenue collection and minimizing its direct
presence in low-income areas, while at the same time ensuring access to potable water. In this
respect, the WUA model was highly effective: not only were the WUAs able to meet these targets,
but they were also able to ensure payment of outstanding debts and make proﬁts. Ironically, WUAs,
which operate in lower-income areas, succeeded in achieving one of the objectives that formal
utilities often fail to achieve, that is, causing the former Managing Director of Uganda’s National
Water and Sewerage Corporation to state that full cost recovery is a myth (Muhairwe, 2006).
For the local elites the management system became an opportunity to reinforce their
privileged status within the community and gain access to resources and decision-making power.
As for WaterAid, the everyday implementation of the model ensured the efﬁcient achievement of
the overall project objective, having water ﬂowing again in the targeted communities. On the other
hand, this objective was achieved to the detriment of norms, goals and guiding principles, reﬂected
inWaterAid’s mission statement and agreement with the LilongweWater Board. Full cost recovery
principles prevailed over the objective of sustainable and affordable water supply to the poor.
Similarly, hierarchic and oligarchic structures and institutions prevailed over principles of
empowerment of the community at large and democratization of decision-making processes. Local
elites, previously reported by the Lilongwe Water Board and WaterAid as embezzling funds from
the kiosks, are now formally recognized and legitimated by the same organizations as leading
authorities in the WUAs. The WUA model internalized the ‘costs’ of embezzlement, which were
transferred from the water utility to the consumers.
In this local adaptation of the model, therefore, design characteristics associated with
empowerment and inclusion of the poor are transformed into ‘disempowering forms of participa-
tion’ (Hickey, 2002, p. 843) or ‘conservative’ forms of participation that only allow for the
inclusion of those community members who are already in a position of power. Rather than giving
‘ordinary’ community members a platform to inﬂuence decisions that affect them, as prescribed by
the generic model, the WUA becomes a mechanism for existing elites to fortify and extend their
elite positions. The interaction between the context and the model thus led to increased inequality
within the community, while at the same time ensuring smoother implementation of the model.
This research raises further questions on the role of ‘ordinary’ community members in
challenging or facilitating the process of elite capture. Elite capture might also be agreed upon or
even be encouraged by community members, who might opt for someone they consider more
clever, vocal, educated or capable to represent them. On a similar note, this research shows that
the everyday implementation of the model leads to uneven outcomes and distribution of beneﬁts
among community members. Further research is required on how beneﬁts are distributed among
community members and, more speciﬁcally, whether and under what circumstances beneﬁts
trickle down to ‘ordinary’ community members. Last, focusing on inequalities within community
members in low-income areas shall not distract attention from the larger issues of inequalities
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within the city and among different areas in the city. The objective of ensuring equitable water
supply within the city has so far eluded all actors concerned: the public water utility, community
based organizations, local leaders and NGOs.
Notes
1. For discussion of everyday practices see, for instance, Loftus (2009).
2. Lilongwe Water Board, GIS Technician, November 2013.
3. The number of people actually using kiosks is difﬁcult to assess. It is generally established that one
kiosk should supply no more than 50 average-size families (250 people).
4. Lilongwe Water Board, Director of the Kiosk Management Unit, January 2009.
5. WaterAid Malawi, Director Urban Program, January 2009.
6. Lilongwe Water Board, Director of the Kiosk Management Unit, January 2009.
7. Lilongwe Water Board, General Director, February 2009
8. WaterAid, www.WaterAid.org/uk/about_us/default.asp, accessed in March 2009. More recently the
mission has been changed to transforming lives by improving access to safe water, hygiene and
sanitation in the world's poorest communities. We work with partners and inﬂuence decision-makers
to maximise our impact, www.WaterAid.org, accessed in July 2010.
9. WaterAid Malawi, Director Urban Program, January 2009. See also: WaterAid’s Global Strategy:
2009–2015, accessed at www.WaterAid.org/uk/~/media/Publications/annual-reports-and-strategies/
WaterAid-global-strategy-2009-2015.pdf.
10. Lilongwe Water Board, Director of the Kiosk Management Unit, January 2009.
11. WaterAid Malawi, Director Urban Program, January 2009.
12. Lilongwe Water Board, General Director, February 2009.
13. Secretariat, Administrator of the WUA in Area 50, February 2009.
14. Lilongwe Water Board, Director of the Kiosk Management Unit, January 2009.
15. Board of Trustees Chair and Member of Parliament in WUA Tsabango, 16 January 2014.
16. Executive Committee, Area 41, January 2009, and Administrator WUA Area 50, February 2009.
17. Member of a local NGO TSP, December 2013.
18. Member of a local NGO TSP, December 2013.
19. Area 50 resident, 14 January 2014.
20. HQ, conducted in March 2009, Area 24, Area 41, Area 46 (Chinsapo).
21. EC member of WUA, Mtandire, January 2014.
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